Introduction:
The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) for "democratization" is not about inereasing [reedom and democracy for people in the region but about inereasing freedom for Westem capital and ensuring continued US political control of the region. Military force, along with other US foreign policy instruments under occupation, continues to be employed to secure the resources of Iraq for US global hegemony and corporate profıts. ı Since maintaining economic and political controlover the entire Middle East through military force would prove too costly, taking control through dandestine political and economic control, under the rubric of a "democracy initiative," is to be pursued in cooperation with the l European Union. The institutions for such control, through a partnership between US Govemment, private US capital, US corporations operating in the region, and local comprador elites, have been in place for some time, as pioneered in US economic and political control in Latin America.
With the neo-eonservative perception that the US policy of supporting authoritarianism in the Middle East has outlived its historical usefulness, renovation of politics and consolidation of US hegemony is now to be carried out through a combination of force and guile, namely incentives purporting to create a free and democratic society. As can be easily understood, at root, neoliberalism is neither free nor democratic. it is the prevailing form of corporate-capital-totalitarianism being locked upon countries and societies around the entire world today. It is not certain if the neoconservatives believe their rhetoric that terrorism will be suppressed through Westem corporate control of the region. The bottom line is control of the politics and capital of the Middle East region through a combination of military force and new institutions working in league with or under the cover of US corporations. The mechanism is explained below. The GMEI is nothing other than the vehicle and blueprint for the extension and consolidation of neoliberalism in the Middle East. In the neo-conservative vision, anything which presents a barrier to this agenda must be ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed.
Since World War II, the United States has largely followed a policy of realist politics around the world in the interests of serving the interests of its domestic ruling class and political constituency, the owners of corporate capitaL. The core of the US domestic political constituency is the corporate class. Under capitalist logic, it was necessary to secure the resources, raw products, labor and markets, of the entire globe as a source of capitalist accumulation. To same extent, benefıts would fıIter down to other classes of the population within the US domestic political economy.
Nevertheless, this agenda, under Cold War containment, counterinsurgency, and subversion of uncooperative regimes, was carried out under the cover of various ideological devices, such as "preserving freedam and the American way of life," "freedom and democracy,"
and spreading "freedom. 2 The well established Wilsonian millenarianism, often with a crusading zeal, served as an appropriate ideological cover for the US enterprise of global hegemony and pursuit of the interests of the domestic ruling classes, one e the US took on the role of global hegemon after World War II.
Consequently, under this rubric, the US carried out the cold war, conducted counterinsurgency against potential social democratic governments, supported authoritarian governments in Latin American and elsewhere, or supported more democratic states as well, depending upon whether this was deemed to serve its interests. National interests were calculated primarily in terms of the needs and benefıts to the corporate class in the pursuit of global capitalist accumulation. 3 Within this framework, the US approach to the Middle East was relatively simple and straight forward, having been essentially settled at the end of the Second World War. Democracy was not considered to be on the charts, under the rubric of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, and the Unites States would support the autocratic and dictatorial regimes which were in place as long as the oil flowed through the US corporate structure. The US would be the regional hegemon with ostensibly independent states. This arrangement was referred to as the "Arab façade." The US would sponsor local "cops on the beat," Israel and Turkey, to help keep order in the region. This was part of the deal which was struck at the end of World War II. "Security" referred to the preservation of the system of capitalist accumulation in the interests of the ruling classes of the US. This "security" arrangement would be enforced by regional arrangements Wittner has noted how the term "democracy" has been used as a marketing device for policies, such as the Truman Doctrine that would otherwise be difficult to seli to the public. Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Abuse of Democraey," History News Network, Nov. 28, 2005 . 3Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, New York, 1992 with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and so on. This often precluded democracy, as with the overthrow of Mohamad Mossadegh in Iran, and put the US at odds with more democratic states, such as India.
Consequently, while lip service was of ten paid to "democratization,"
in actual practice, democratic regimes were supported only in cases in which it was c1ear that it would protect capital and serve the US corporate class. In practice, US foreign policy was generally one of "deterring democracy," in which scores of regimes were overthrown by the CIA, which held the promise of the emergence of local democratic autonomy, which was deemed to militate against the needs of the US corporate ruling c1ass.4
The history of US foreign policy since World War II has been fairly consistent and significant shifts in the policy of support for authoritarian regimes, such as in Latin America in the 1970s, have been consistent with the bottom line of a rational caleulus about what served the domestic ruling class, rather than any abstract ideals about freedom and democracy. There is no reason why one should expect any radical shift in this historical approach in the near future trajectory of US foreign policy.
Prior to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003, and following the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, some of the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration declared that the US policy of appeasement of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East had failed and that the US must move quickly to remove these regimes and establish democracy across the region.5 Regime change emerged as a new buzz word.
Nevertheless, the Iraq war was not launchcd upon the rationale of establishment of democracy, but rather upon the rationale that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had established links with al-Qaeda. When the Iraq War began to go badly and encounter stiff resistance from indigenous forees, in the fall of 2003, it beeame c1ear that the US was in for a long hard slog. The idea of Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), developed by the US State Department was to be anather tool of imperialist control which could be used to secure the resources, labor and markets of the region to beef up US global hegemony and secure corporate profıts in the region, while theoretically, ending any incentives for terrorism. It is not c1ear if the neo-conservative ideologues took this argument seriously, but the rational of "democratization" went forward under the same rubric as the invasion of Iraq, that of the "War on Terrorism." In fact, as will be argued below, both enterprises were of a piece with pushing forward the logic of serving the US ruling class in consolidation the global rule of neoliberalism and increasing global power and corporate profits. Under sleight of hand, the same mechanisms developed and used in Latin American would be brought in, opening the channels and f100dgates for a massiye f10w of new CIA money into the region on behalf of US capitaL. AIso the Helsinki Agreements of 1975, which were seen to encourage the reforms in the govemments of Eastem Europe, were seen to provide a model for the process of political reform which was envisioned.
The 2002-2003 UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDP) highlighted "three defıcits" in Middle Eastcm societies: Freedom, Knowledge, and Women's EmpowermenL The logic forwarded was that these deficits contributed to a pool of disenfranchised individuals and led to an increase in extremism, terrorism, international erime, and illegal immigration to Europe and beyond. The thrust of the initiative was that to address these deeper problems, which bred terrorism and other ilis, political reform and democratization was a priority. change in the Middle East. Fourthly, there would be a Greater Middle East Literacy Corps. Fifthly, it would establish a G-8 microfinance pilot project, based upon an existing French proposal, fund new smail businesses, and contribute to building an Arab "middle class." Other elements of the program included "civic education" programs, technical assistance with voter registration, parliamentary exchanges and training, women's leadership workshops, legal aid, media training, "anti-corruption" efforts, strengthening NGO's (which may actually only masquerade as NGOs), and support for certain labor unions.
One can get a better picture of what is intended here by noting the emphasis upon business initiatives, business education, civil society, human rights, and training political party leaders. The document suggests that the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance, with an American director and a partnership with several US universities, could serve as a model for other countries. The program would provide an avenue for US universities to market their educational programs, tailored to corporate needs, to the Middle East region. it was said that the "key" to the program was "unleashing the region's private potential", under the auspices of Westem and American capital, of course, which has ever been the formula for US requirements for allowing a region of the world to develop. The initiative also emphasized the growth of an "entrepreneurial class" to "help democracy and freedom flourish." This also gives a clue as to the type democracy that the program will foster. A neoliberal capitalist framewark that provides freedom for Westem capital and defined as "democracy," is the desired final product. In fact, it is widely recognized by serious political econornists that in today's global political economy, there is a sharp contradiction between capitalism and democracy, between corporate profit and democracy, and between corporate control and democracy. The GMEI is clearly concemed with freedom for capital, rather than freedom for human individuals.
The GM EI also calls for the establishment of a Greater Middle East Development Bank (GMED Bank), a "partnership for financial excellence," and an emphasis upon "removing barriers to crossborder financial transactions." In other words, neoliberal financial liberalization, which has been the cause of many financial crises around the world in recent years, is given a high priority. Financial services will be liberalized, to allow the marketing and control of local fınancial institutions by Westem capitaL. There will be promotion of intra-regional trade, a push for WTO accession for countries, export processing zones, which are referred to as Business Incubation Zones (BIZ), and special trade zones. This will increase the process of the maquiladorization of the Middle EasL Of course when smail business enterprises succeed through US taxpayer dollars, the big sharks, Westem corporations will be there to buy them up and broaden the foundation of fırms for capital accumulation on a global scale. From the above, we see that the GMEI is c1early the thin edge of a wedge to transform the entire Middle East under the banner of neoliberal global corporate control. The Arabs were not being unrealistic when they charged that the program was designed for imperialist control of the region. That is what it is for. But generally, analysts have been observed to dismiss such charges out of hand as theyare not considered to be in good taste in today's global business environmenL At the same time, this is not to say that nothing is posltıve about the program. For example, literacy and women's education could be a positive contribution.
In a dialectical way, capitalism of ten develops the tools for potential human liberation. On the other hand, we are not to see the "invisible hand" of the CIA that is driving this program in the interests of the domestic ruling class in the interests of US and Westem capitaL. This is to remain hidden.
One can readily discem that the elements laid out here are in fact those aıready established in the NED model that have been pioneered outside the Middle East region and which serve as mechanisms of control by the US Govemment through concealed arrangements with private corporations. The mechanism and operative principles of this regime, promulgated from the bowels of the CIA in Washington, is laid out in some further detail below.
While the initial reaction in Arab countries was negative, it has been argued that the document had some immediate positive results in foreing govemments to take some reform initiatives, however halting. In Egypt, the Legal CommiUee of the Govemment appointed a National Council for Human Rights (NCHR). This commİUee proceeded to recommend that the state of emergency be rescinded. In Libya, Colonel Gaddafı pledged to caneel the Emergency Law. The Palestinian Authority announced that elections would be held. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah hosted a series of "National Dialogue Forums" and promised that municipal council elections would be held. To some extent these were efforts to pre-empt pressures which these nations expected from the WesL The feeling among many was that the proposal would not be accepted as long as US troops occupied Iraq. In Egypt the "chronic indifference" to reform and moving toward "democratization" was apparenL Members of the ruling National Democratic Party defended the Government and criticized the US initiative. Mohamed Abdellah, former head of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee called the GMEI a "smokescreen." Abu Zejd, Chairman of the Parliamentary Arab-Affairs Committee said the Arab-Israeli conflict, which breeds terror, must fırst be solved. Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said "reform must come from within the Arab world" and claimed that Egypt had aıready made democratic achievements, such as democratic reform, women's emancipation, human rights, and educational reforms. Gamel Mubarak, the son of the President and Chairman of the NDP Policy Secretariat, argued that the Party is truly open to reform. Others, such as Secretary General Hussein Abdel-Razeg of the leftist Tagammu Party, stated truthfully what everyone knew, that the NDP was "dragging its [eet" and would be subject to more pressure from the US. Egypt had yet to 13Gambiıı, "lumpstarting Arab Reform."
"appease" the US in the area of democratization because the ruling party considered it so dangerous. The Secretary General of the NDP, Safwat EI-Sharif had announced that amending the Constitution is not on the agenda of political reform in Egypt. Many other members of the opposition in Egypt were seen to be supporting the US pressure for reform as the ruling party had refused to make any reforms over a 22 year period.
14
In practice, however, as Patrick Buchanan has pointed out, opening up the system has perils for Washington too, as it would likely bring the Islamist fundamentalists to power.
At the G-8 Summit in Sea Island Georgia, after considerable modification, two documents were actually approved, designated collectively as the "Broader Middle East and North African Initiative (BMENAI). Many leaders, including Mubarak, refused to attend the Sea Island meeting. Leaders came from Afghanistan, AIgeria, Bahrain, lordan, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and Iraq. Documents approved were a 12-point Partnership for Progress and a Common Future With the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa" and the "G-8 Plan of Support for Reform." Unlike the GMEI, the actually agreed upon BMENAI received little attention in the press, after being watered down to pass muster with European and Middle Eastern Nations. The original document was modified in significant ways. First, the BMENAI acknowledged the Arab-Israel conflict and called for support for reform in the region to go "hand in hand" with "support for a just, comprehensive, and lasting settle to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Secondly, the revised document stressed that reform should not be imposed from the outside but depend upon countries in the region. Third, governments should not necessarily be expected to change. Fourth, there would be no universally recognized standards. Diversity of countries should be respected. Fifth, each country would decide upon the 'pace and scope of change." Sixth, the idea of organizing an NGO to monitor reform progress was rejected. Seventh, government to government meetİngs would be held as a "Forum for the Future." Conferences would be arranged for exchanges between business and civil society leaders. ls Academics and analysts, rather than analyzing the root s of the 14Gamal Essam El-Din, "Reformed and Reformulating." ISGambiIl, "Jumpstarting Arab Reform." Inıtıatıve, generaııy took the initiative at face value as one can see from a number of academic exchanges which have taken place concerning the initiative and the larger question of democratization in the Middle East. 16
The ideological Neo-conservative Perspective:
The hard vision was laid out by Victor Davis Hanson in the Weekly Standard. l7 This is a crusading vision which rejects both those who argue that it wiıı be difficult to establish democracy in Iraq after US invasion and occupation, and those who argue that the best course will be for the US to faıı back upon pro-US despotism. Hanson rejects the notion that lack of a democratic tradition and a middle class militates decidedly against the establishment of democracy. He extends this vision to the subsequent reconfiguration of the Middle East, across a wide region. He has little patience with the arrangement of supporting the pro-US despotism of General Pervez Musharaf in Pakistan. He urges the US to decide upon a course of 16 action before the invasion and stick to it, regardless of the cost.
Hanson argues that this is the "practical" course of action because legitimate governments have power over dictatorships. He argues that past US policy has failed, such as the "appeasement of [Yassir] Arafat" and the Palestinians, while pushing for democratic reform with no signifıcant results. He sees this as a process, not the installation of "Jeffersonian Democracy" at once. The first step is to "remove the dictator," and this is most likely to have to be done with a war or at least considerable force. He is apparently not concerned about the international illegality of such use of military force. He is not concerned that "regime change" by the US may create chaos. Even chaos is seen as better than what exists. What emergcs will be flawed, to be sure, but this is not to deter the US. The emcrgence of a flawed democracy is better than the status quo because eventually the people will realize that it is up to them to make things better. "Better to deal with a subverted democracy: At least its people will soon realize they, not the United States, are responsible for their disasters." The people are responsible. The model will be something like Panama, Grenada, Serbia, and Philippines. Regardless of the risks, the venture is necessary because it is not possible to leave the Middle East alone, after 9/1 ı. it is "pathological" and will only get worse, so the US really has no choice.
He says that Americans have been told that there are two types of regimes in the Middle East, except Israel which is democratic. The fırst type includes "sponsors of terrorism," such as Afghanistan (before the removal of the Taliban), AIgeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The second type includes the "moderate dictatorships," such as Egypt, the Gulf states, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. But on balance, after 9/1 l, there is not a lot of difference between these regimes for Hanson. Theyare all sick societies, breeding terrorists. He argues that both kinds of governments "seek to survive through bribery, oppression, and censorship, and by scapegoating Israel and America." There is the absence of elections, no free speech, lack of any public audit of government fınances, and use of the "bogeyman of the West" as an excuse for all their ilis.
Nevertheless, in the end, he believes the fact is that the Arab masses hate their own governments more than they hate the US. The last two decades of ruined economics has "brought nothing but [VOL. XXXVI disaster." He sites the Arab Human Development Report 2002, as the best evidence for this. There is a high populalion growth leading to 38 percent of the population being under fourteen years of age. The minimal GNP in the region means that 22 Arab countries have a combined GDP of less than that of Spain. On the other hand, the wealthiest 85,000 Saudi families have $700 billion in overseas assets.
Hanson neglects to explore how the US encouraged this situation, selling useless arms, and recycling petrodollars through US bank's so that some seven percent of the US economy is now owned by the Saudi Royal Family. It is also not explored how well global capitalism has done in developing the world in general. And what exactly does Westem capital want to see happen in the region? Will the proflts stay in the countries of the region or go to US, Israel, and Europe. These are larger questions that need to be addressed in a critique with a historically realistically view. Labor productivity in the Middle East has actually fallen between 1960 and 1990, Hanson notes, and even Africa has outperformed the Middle East in economic growth. Too few foreign books are being translated into Arabic. Half of the youths wish to emigrate, most often to the US and Europe. Rather facetiously, Hanson presents the US as a country that has tried everything in the Middle East, and is now "exasperated" at the lack of cooperation and progress.
In other words, with things so bad and getting worse, the US really has nothing to lose in going after the Middle East with a meat cleaver. Whatever the result, it can't get worse. In any event, there is really no choice. Supporting the se regimes did not address the problem of "Arab development." it failed, but now there is little to fear. Without the USSR, the US is free to do what it wants in the region. Great progress has been made in Afghanistan, he beIİeves. He dismisses the critics. They were wrong about Japan, Italy, and Germany after WWII. The US overcame all the predicted difficulties, so there is no reason why this should not happen in the Middle East as welL. it is uncertain if Hanson would stili defend this pre-Iraq invasion version of events after the chaos the US has encountered there, as predicted by the most knowledgeable about the region.
And "democracy" is the only game in town. For Hanson, it has no rivals. He does not deflne what he means by "democracy" but it is obviously the US vision of "neoliberalism." It is Francis Fukuyama's liberal utopia of the "Iast man". What it seems is really being forwarded is the thesis that "there is no alternative." This is because "democracy" has no rivals. The US need not fear competition from "French Marxism," "communist nostalgia," "Baathist nonsense," nor "Islami st fundamentalism." On the other hand, the US "has an ally in global popular culture." It becomes obvious that Hanson is talking about the type of "democracy" which exists in the United States, in which the actual constituency is the corporate ruling class. He does not recognize the possibility of a popular democracy in which the constituency would be the masses or majority of the people. So this ties in nicely with the Fukuyamian thesis that liberalism, or rather neo-Iiberalism, is the end of historyand nothing else can challenge this paradigm. Neoliberalism has become the global totalitarian ideologyand we can all be happy that we live in such a totalitarian world. Now we just have to make sure that the Middle East goes along with the program.
But there are dangers too, for Hanson. "Establishing lawful rule in lawless places entails costs and dangers," he quickly adds. He argues that either war or the threat of force must be used. "Military power must be decisive.' Another price the US must be ready to pay is "the lengthy presence of American troops." Not everyone will be happy. "We must expect and not fear anti-Americanism." So for Hanson, the old game of "propping up strong men in the name of stability" is over. It is to "flout the aspirations of long-suppressed peoples and forget out national principles." The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, and "in our own national interest, we must make sure that our policies evolve with il." The old option is no longer there and "the Islamic world lost the privilege of being differenl."ls They too are to be brought into the neo-liberal totalitarian world and serve their proper role of serving the needs of global capitalist accumulation. Having committed the sin of defying their masters, in 9/11, they will now be taken to the woodshed and learn their proper place in the world. This vision is indeed consistent with the prevailing racist and neocolonial world view of the neoconservatives on the Potomac.
The Real key: The model, which İs the basİs of the GMEI, and how it works Philip Agee, a former CIA employee, has explained the evolution and functioning in practice of the institutions which the US has set up to control the politics and economies of countries around the world. The GMEI seeks to extend this system to the whole of the "greater Middle East."19 Disguised as activities to "promote democracy," "resolve conflicts," and "strengthen civic life," the United States has spent some nine million US dollars in 2005 to remove President Hugo Chavez Frias from power in Venezuela. This is up from two million dollars in 2001, when a failed coup was carried out. The United States provides money, training, counsel, and direction to a network of political parties, NGOs, mass media outlets, trade unions, and businessmen to end the democratic reforms being carried out by Chavez. One can readily see that this is the same model which is to be applied to the Middle East. In other words, to call such a program of regime change against the democratic wishes of the local people "democratization" is, to say the least, the epitome of Orwellian doublespeak.
The coup being carried out from behind the scenes in Venezuela is directed by the US State Department, the architect of the GMEI, the Agency for International Development (AID) and the CIA. The primary organization is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its four subsidiary organizations. These are the National Democratic Institute ( The US seeretly penetrated politieal parties; trade umons; student and youth organizations; eultural, professional and intellectual soeieties; women' s organizations; religious organizations; the eommunieations media; and eivil soeiety organizations. Money was funded through third foundations, often foundations set up for the purpose by the CIA. These programs beeame important for Latin Ameriea in the 1970s, under President Jimmy Carter, when the US shifted its policy from supporting dietatorships in Latin Ameriea.
These CIA operations ran into trouble in 1967, when the CIA eover was blown and the operations revealed to the publie. Over the next few years, the system was revamped and put baek on traek through a new set of organizations whieh appeared to be above board and legitimate. What eame to be put in plaee is primarily the set of organizations whieh operate under the National Endowment for Demoeraey (NEO) today, and whieh are to be a very vital part of the OME!. NEO was established by Congress in 1983 and put under the control of the State Department. Money would be funneled to politieal parties and organizations abroad whieh supported policies which strengthened "US national interests." Today political parties and eivil soeiety organizations are supported whieh promote 20philip Agee, "The Nalure of CIA Intervention in Venezuela," www.zmag,org, March 23, 2005. 2lAgee, "Ho w United States Intervention Against Venezuela Works." neoliberalism, privatization, deregulation, control of trade unions, reduction of social welfare, elimination of tariffs, and free access to markets, In other words, these operations are very much an integral part of US foreign policy operations.
While the NED is legally an NGO, this is not actually the case, and USAID and the CIA fully participate in the se programs to "promote democracy." NED functions, for all practical purposes, as an arm of the US State Department. In 1984, USAID established the Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI), renamed as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994. Along with NED, these organizations channel funds abroad through a network of US Foundations, consulting firms, and public relations firms, in order to conceal the US Government connection. While the official line is that these organizations work to "strengthen civil society," they merely support the groups that support US interests and oppose those which do not. This, of course, is again Orwellian, as it promotes US control, not democracy. Undermining local democratization is promoted as "democratization. "
These organizations were used to defeat the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua in the 1990 elections and similar operations are now being conducted against President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It is believed that the cost of the Nicaragua operation in 1989 was some $20 million. 22 Today, the consulting firm, Development Alternatives, Inc., has carried out development projects in some 150 countries including a number of countries of the Middle East. The corporation is considered to be an ideal corporate stmcture for inserting CIA officers and agents. Contracts with USAID, operating in Venezuela, have been obtained and posted on the Internet. It is clear that these operations are designed to carry out the precise programs outlined in the GM E!. They conduct "workshops, seminars, conferences and training courses to develop political parties. They form political party coalitions, mn programs to register yoters, and conduct programs to 22Agee, "The Nature of CIA Intervention in Venezuela." get out the vote. 23 Can Turkey be a Model For Democracy in the Middle East?
Some analysts have made the casc that for the US and European approach to democratizing the Middle East, the current Turkish Government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan can serve as an instruetive example. 24 The Justice and Development Party Government (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Ak Parti) shows that "religious political movemcnts in the Muslim world can take the lead in introducing greater social, political and economic freedam to their societies." It is claimed that in Turkey' s case "the evolutian of a modernizing Islamist political force was facilitated by external pressures for reform." 'Turkey has been cajoled, pressured and encouraged by the West in its journey toward full and mature democracy." The conclusian is that "if Western governments hope to see this evolutian take place across the Middle East, they would do well to study closely what is happening in Ankara." That is seen as a mistake, despite the fact that around 90 percent of the Turkish people opposed the bilL. The mainstream US sentiment is that once the leaders get the knack of ruling, the new ruling party will fall into the grove of crushing democracy in the interests of United States. See Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics," Foreign Affairs, 84 (6), Nov.-Dec., 2005, p. 84. For Cooley, this democratic decision revealed an "institutional weakness" typical of "young democracies." In this US view, the Turkish Prime Minister was mistaken that it was a 'victory of democracy." Rather, "democraey," in US terms, would have meant going against the wİII of 90 percent of the Turkish people. it would be difficult to find a better example of how "democraey" for the US is defined as that which serves US national interests.
it is true that Turkey has taught the West, particularly the United States, something about democracy, in the recent past, but it is not what is suggested by this argument. In fact, Turkey taught the US a lesson in democracy when in 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted to refuse permission for the US anny to cross Turkish soil in its invasion of Iraq. This was met with an angry reaction from US authorities who upbraided the Turkish military for not carrying out their dutyand ensuring that the bill would pass. The US threatened to cut aid to Turkey. In the Spring of 2005, the US Ambassador, Kenneth Adelman, requested that Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, request the Turkish newspaper, Yeni Safak, not to publish artides critical of the US in Iraq. Over and over, the US Embassy in Ankara has made moves to counter the emerging spirit of democracy in Turkey, especially in relation to the unpopularity of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq.
In the realm of civil society, the weekend of 24 June, 2005, the world tribunal on the Iraq war was being held in Istanbul, which also militates against the image of the US in the region. This is part of democratization, of course, and was widely covered by TV in Turkey, while being boycotted by the supposedly "free press" Westem press outlets like BBC and CNN. In other words, the United States has expressed hostility to democratization in Turkey in a number of ways, as it is seen to militate against US interests.
The above argument made by Thomas Carroll about Turkey under the Ak Partyas a model is misleading in a number of ways. Most significantly, it is not very convincing that the Turkish experience is relevant to the Arab countries of the Middle East. It does not seem very profound that Turkey shows that democracy can co-exist with Islam, as this has been shown in a number of countries, for example, India.
In the case of the Ak Party Govemment in Turkey, first, it is incorrect that Erdogan' s program for further democratization and entry into the European Union has been driven by outside pressure. In the past, traditional Turkish leaders simply dug in their heels when confronted with outside pressure from Europe. Erdogan knew that the desire to mo ve forward on democratization and entry into the European Union was broadly popular in the country and used this to gain votes in the November 2002 eleetion. Secondly, political modernization for the Ak Party sometimes means greater freedom for Moslems, for example in terms of wearing headscarf in schools, and so is useful not in terms of moving in a secular direction, but in giying more religious freedom from the state. While this could be seen as political modernization, it is generally seen by secularists as regression, rather than modernization, in the social arena.
Secondly, there is no other country in the Middle East where the people are driven by the historical desire to be part of Europe and today see the possibility of actually joining the European Union. Thirdly, much of the population of Turkey does not see the Ak Party agenda as a modernizing force at all, but rather pursuing an agenda in which a religious party in secular c10thing pursues a hidden sometimes religious agenda and is rolling back the modernizing secular reforms of Ataturk. The secular elites feel threatened by the wide scale staffing of state institutions, including culture and education, with Islamists. Fourth, it is not c1ear that the Ak Party is, in fact, a modernizing regime. In the economic field, the agenda is one of neoliberalism and privatization. While this may be seen by some as "freedom" it is not the case for workers and trade unions, nor those who want Turkey to have some democratic economic autonomy from the IMF neo-liberal agenda. In the changing of the laws to conform to the European Union, this is not always seen as modernization in the Turkish context as it opens the way for greater freedom for religious movements. It is not c1ear that ruling Turkey from Brussels is exactly "democratic" as it surely strips the local people of any controlover their own lives. it seems that roads and shopping centers are being modernized but not necessarily culture and society. Fifth, people voted for Erdogan not because he was a "modernizer" but mainly because they were fed up with every other political party in the country for failing to provide a stable economy and government. The other parties were accurately seen as either corrupt or incompetent. Moreover, Erdogan had promised to largely keep the state and government secular. People wanted to throw the old leaders out and get beyond the series of economic crises. Sixth, the extent of reforms which have been achieved should not be exaggerated. The state security courts have been officially abolished, but states are creative in finding new ways to continue the same old practices in new ways. Seventh, the United States is not happy with the Ak Party Govemment as noted above. Erdogan's govemment does not fıt the mold of what the US would !ike. Mareaver, the Govemment is pursuing many programs which depart signifıcantly from neoliberalism in giying opportunities to the downscale in the country. These include subsidized loans for low-income housing and so on. Erdogan has sametimes sharply criticized US po!icies in Iraq and foreign policy more generaliyanumber of times, which has not gone dow n well with the United States. Further, the United States has pointedly let the Govemment know that it is not happy with the level of anti-Americanism in Turkey after the invasion of Iraq. The United States has criticized the Govemment for not doing more to influence public opinion. This is surely a shocking and shameful attack upon Turkish democraey. Appealing to the Turkish Govemment to crush public opinion regarding US foreign policy in the region is not likely to enhance the US as a country which promotes democraey. The Turkish public has enough examples to get the picture. It is not clear exactly what the Turkish Govemment is supposed to do to control public opinion. Considering these facts, the Turkish model could sink US hopes in the Middle East quite decidedly.
Finally, rather than enhance the image of the Westem democraey, European Union and American pressure on the country has actually caused a backlash of public opinion, with more and more people saying that they do not really care if Turkey enters or nal. So extemal pressure may in fact be doing more harm that good. 25 Given the operational plans of the US, the argument misses the poinL The US has no desire to transfer the Turkish model, which is defective in many ways from the US standpoinL it is not the Islamist element that the US opposes, but the courage of those in the Govemment to refuse to tae the US party line. On the other hand, the US has tried and true methods to create the sorts of US engincered "democratic" systems that will serve its purpose, as we see above. This makes the argument quite irrelevant and shows that it misses the point of what is going on, rather badly.
25lbid.
What İs Democracy? lt appears that nowhere in the documents and discussion of the GMEI is there a working definition of democracy. There are at least two different categories of definitions of democracy. One is the plain English, generic, definition of democracy. Second is the doctrinal definition of democracy which might be used by a regime to define "democracy." In the US context, the doctrinal meaning has very little to do with the generic meaning. Democracy may be defined as "a govemment by the people, especially rule of the majority. A govemment in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by the m directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held elections."
On the other hand, there is the doctrinal definition of democracy. This is what is used by the Bush Administration. In this sense, "democracy" is that which serves the US "national security interests." This can be further c1arified by noting that it is what serves to insure and protect capitalist accumulaLİon and power. It serves both US global hegemony and capitalist accumulation. It will be seen that within this context, the rigged elections carried out under US occupation in Iraq, as in January 30, 2005, are "democratic. On the other hands, the June 2005 elections in Iran are not "democratic." Elections in Venezuela, which continue to keep Hugo Chavez in power, are not democratic since they do not serve the interests of US and global capitaP6 For the US, genuinely democratic elections Chavez, unlike Bush, has used the nation's wealth for social welfare, that is, for the people. Some ı.4 million have learned to read, three millian adults have enrolled in schooling projects, thousands of medical c1inics have been built, 20,000 doctors have been brought in from Cuba to provide free health care to 70 percent of the population and 60 percent get free food. A chain of 14,000 stores have been created to seli at a 35 percent which bring popular leaders to power, but which militate against the interests of capital, are, by definition, not demoeratic. What democratic elections are to protect is capital and not the people. They are to bring to the fare goveroments of capital, by capital and for capitaL.
We can see that in the US context, democracy alsa involves rigging the system. There are many ways in which this is accomplished in the US. The first past the post system, the redistricting and gerrymandering, eliminatian of sections of the population who are not desirable vaters, and so on, are actually ways to rig elections. A narrow political spectrum exists, which alsa effectively precludes democraey. Neoliberalism, perhaps is the most pointed mechanism taday for the eliminatian of democracy on a global scale, as it precludes allowing people to make the democratic decisions about matters, such as jobs and benefits, that most affect their ]ives.
In Japan, after WWII, the US set up the desirable type of system, from the point of view of capital, where a conservative probusiness party was the only party which could actually win the elections. This means that in such a "liberal system," a pro-capital party, such as the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is going to end up controlling the system in the interest of US capitalist accumulation. discount to the poor. This, in US terms, is not demoeratic and the US is worrİed that "other leaders like Chavez may emerge." The political parti es which boycotted the national assembly election in early December 2005, may have been encouraged by the United States to do so. They were expecting to do poorly at the polIs. Roger Burbach, "Bush vs. Chavez," Nov. The de facto system of "democracy" in the US alsa means that it eliminates any group or party that would serve to he Ip the pOOL Any voices that might militate against the agenda of capitalİst accumulatİon will be eliminated. This is alsa seen in the approach to Venezuela. When genuine democracy emerges, it must be denied that it is democratic and destroyed. This is the histarical pattern. Traditionally, when the masses raise their heads to participate, political scientists in the US have treated this as a "crisis of democracy." lt signifies the problem of too many demands on the system or "to o much democracy." What this means is that participation of the masses does not serve the agenda of accelerating capitalist accumulation.
Democracy in the Middle East and US National Interests:
As noted above, since WWII, the US has operated cavert election operations. These essentially subvert "free elections" around the world. This started with Italy after WWII to prevent the Communist Party from coming to power. This activity continues taday. It is clear that if the US was really interested İn supporting free and fair elections, there would be a sharp break from this standard operating procedure. But it is simply not plausible that the neoconservatives in Washington would be interested in opening up electoral systems in the Middle East to genuine democracy.27 As Robert Fisk has pointed out, the US has not tolerated undemocratic regimes, it has actively promoted them for more than 50 years. 28 Given the record and the objectives of the neo-conservatİves to control the entire world as the global hegemon, it is simply not plausible that they would take their chances in an area so vital to US national security interests. We can understand this by considering the possible scenario in a number of countries in the region. Iran. In the early 1950s the US overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh, restored Shah Reza Pehlavi to power, and kept the Shah in power until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The US overthrow was a case of ending a regime that had come to power democratically. Is it plausible that the US will support popular democracy today in Iran, given the level of anti-Americanism?
In the elections of 24 June, 2005, the hard-line fonner mayor of Tehran, Amedinajad was elected PresidenL Even though there were clear irregularities, it can be seen that this was basically a democratic process, at least as democratic as that in Iraq on January 30, 2005. The US has recently called the Iranian elections "illegitimate." The tum out was more than twice that in EgypL If the candidates are controlled, then by the same token, there is a quite tight controlling of the candidates in the US elections as welL. It is true that there were dirty tricks and that liberal candidates were disqualified. So democracy is working to a significant extent. It was the result of a populism which mobilized the votes of the poor Muslim masses from the mosques, for better social welfare, some sops from the regime and to get the m to support the more conservative clerics. The critical remarks of George W. Bush about the Iranian election also seem to have backfired. So here the result of democracy is the opposite of what Bush and the neo-conservatives would like to see. 30 Israel: The changing nature of the political regime in Israel has been noted by some scholars who argue that it is difficult to refer to this regime as a democracy for a number of reasons. Israel has no constitution. it is democratic by definition, but not when one looks at the actual content and practices in how the system operates. The United States will not demand that democratic reform take place in Israel, which is aıready rated as a free and democratic state.
Iraq. The US sought to guide a process in which genuinely free elections, which were risky, were avoided. The US was actually was in favor of postponing elections until the situation would be less volatile and easier to control. But the US was compelled to go ahead with the elections because of Grand Ayatolloh Ali al-Systani. Even so, the US was pressed to control the results, staging a large-scale election rigging operation in the January 2005 elections so that the Shiites would not get an absolute majorityand control the writing of the new constitution. In the event, the elections could not be rigged well enough, and the situation was made more difficult for the US. Nevertheless, the US has attempted to capitalize on the results of the eleetion. The de facto situation after the elections has been much worse, in terms of the "insurgency," that is the resistance to occupation. It is unknown as to what extent the referendum on the Iraqi Constitution was manipulated in üctober 2000, but it is well known that the US has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the country for the "promotion of democracy." üne cannot have a great dea i of faith that the elections were "free and fair' to say the least. Elections held under military occupation are not generally considered to be legitimate. It is possible that democratization will lead to the regime becoming a theocracy, and may break up into three countries. 32 The results of the December 2005 elections are yet to be determined but it is c1ear that the US has spend hundreds of millions Cole points out that the Iraqi Constitution is a serious setback for women and they could yet be subject to Islamic personal law. Linzer report s that Bush authorized covert plans to try to rig the Iraqi elections but that the plans were not carried out. This contradicts the report by Seymour Hersh that the US did carry out a large election operation using retired CIA officers to try to cover their tracks. In any event, the US attempt to get lyad Allawi elected was a hopeless failure. Perhaps it was a smail victory for democracy in the collapse of the US plans.
of dollars under oecupation to promote its favored candidates, namely Iyad Allawi and Ahmed Chelabi.
Palestine: The US would not allow elections to be held in the territories as long as Arafat was living, as he would have won. Now the US has the problem of the popularity of Hamas and the danger of their winning. It will be very problematic for the US to promote genuine democracy here and it would be exceedingly foolish to imagine that this would happen.
Saudi Arabia. Would the US be willing to see the system here opened up to genuine democraey? The Wahhabis could actually come to power if free and fair elections were to be held. Their base is in the poor and Islamist communities, as well as stretching up into the ruling family. it is not likely that US interests would actually prevail in an eleetion, given the amount of Anti-American sentiment in the region. Elections could well militate against US interests.
According to Milan Rai, in some sense, the Wahhabis are actually in power in the Kingdom as the al-Saud family is the "guarantor and promoter" of Wahabbism around the world. It is the "state religion" and is enforced by "force and largesse." But it could also lead to the overthrow of the House of Saud because of corruption. So according to this view, terrorism is not being controlled. It would be too dangerous for the present rulers to open up and allow women to vote and drive. 33 Pakistan. The US is fırmly behind the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharif. Musharif says with a straight face that Pakistan is being ruled under a democraey. But political parties have mostly been banned, and it does not appear as a democraey. In fact, the country is one of the most violently anti-American countries, Osama bin Laden is a local folk hero among large masses of the people, and so democratic elections in the country are very problematical for the United States. Democratic elections would not be likely to serve US national security interests. [VOL. XXXVI from the country wiıı be. Democracy in the country has been destroyed in the past, not just by the interference of Syria, but by the invasion of Israel in 1982 that disrupted the country. There could be a return of the violence of the 1970s.
Genuine democracy, and the likely results, is unthinkable and unacceptable to the US in most cases in the Middle East. Only a doctrinaire facade of democracy that aııows the US to control elections is likely to be acceptable in Washington. On the other hand, in Latin America, and particularly in Venezuela, where genuine democracy has taken place, the US has a massiye program to destroy this democracy.
The Neoconservatİves: Where İs the Democracy?
Just how far the US has departed from those who founded the Republic can be seen in a quote from John Quincy Adams. "America is not anation meant to order others how to live and then push them at bayonet point into that lifestyle. The cost of such a policy would be the loss of America's Sou!."34 Moreover, recent poııs have shown that majorities neither in the US not in the Middle East support the goals of the US spreading democracy to the region. This would question whether the Bush approach, itself, has democratic backing. it simply does not. A poıı by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Program on International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland (PIPA), showed that of 808 randomly selected respondents in the US, the foııowing results were obtained. Only 35 percent favor the use of military force to overthrow dictators; 74 percent said that the goal of overthrowing the Baathist Regime and instaııing democracy is not a good enough reason for war, with 60 percent of Republicans agreeing; 66 percent said that threatening military intervention to bring about democratic change does more harm than good; only 26 percent said that more democracies would make the world safer, only 26 percent believcd that Saudi Arabia would be more friendly to the 34Michael Scheuer, "Deliberately Destroying America's Saul," April 28, 2005, Antiwar.cam.
US if it was a democraey; and only 42 percent said democracy, in general would make countries more friendly to the US. While 80 percent said that democracy is the best form of government, only 50 percent believed that it was best for all countries; 33 percent believed that democracy and Islam are incompatible, with 55 percent believing that Islamic countries can be democratic; 54 percent said that the US should not press for democracy if it is likely it would lead to an Islamic fundamentalist government; only 27 percent said that promoting democracy is a very important foreign policy goal, with 49 percent saying it was somewhat important; 75 percent said the US should not spend money to influence elections in its interests (69 percent of Republicans and 83 percent of Democrats); and 68 percent of people favored working through the UN. When asked how democratic the US is on a scale of O to 10, the mean response was 6.2. When asked how much impact the views of the majority have on decisions of elected officials, the mean was only 4.5, but at the same time, the respondents said it should be 8.0. 35 As another measure of how well democracy is working in the US, 49 out of 57 communities in town meetings in Vermont approved resolutions to withdraw troops from Iraq. Some 53 percent of Americans say the Iraq War was not worth fighting, 57 percent disapprove of Bush's handling of the War, and 70 percent say the US casualties are too high a price to pay. Further, only 8 percent supported a hegemonic role for the US in the world, 70 percent opposed the idea of the US as a world policeman and 57 percent said the US should not have an absolute majority at the UN. Some 60 percent approved of making the UN more powerful. A majority approved of the US joining the International Criminal Court, signing the Kyoto Treaty on Global Warming, ratifying the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and ratifying the convention on the ban of land mines. 36 This simply shows that the neoconservative agenda in the US is not supported by a majority.
Moreover, Bush's claim to spread democracy is not popular in the Middle East. Arecent poll in six Middle East countries showed that 69 percent say that democracy is not the real objective of the US (78 percent on Egypt and 77 percent in Morocco); only 6 percent said that spreading democracy was an important objective and would make a difference; and some 16 percent said that spreading democracy was an important objective but the US is doing it the wrong way.37
Conclusion: Neo-totalitarianism and Global Capitalist Accumulation
The GMEI for democratization in the Middle East cannot be taken seriously as democracy is incompatible with the central tenets of the ideology of neoliberalism, which is itself essentially a totalitarian system. The neo-conservatives hold that the US must be the global hegemon with no possible rival and that there can be only one possible political and economic system, to which there is no alternative. The recognition of this fact actually means that politics, that is democracy, is actually eliminated for all practical purposes. There can be no democratic struggle over the division of the spoils, as this question has aıready been settled. If there is no alternative, there can be no democracy.
Genuinely democratic states of the Middle East, on the other hand, would demand to control their own resources, particularly oil. They would demand autonomy from US and Israeli capital with freedom to run their own economies. In genuinely democratic states, people would be free to oppose political regimes and at the same time, the agendas of Washington, including IMF austerity programs. The United States has shown that it is not comfortable with aspects of democratization in Turkey, or elsewhere, which questions US hegemony.
That the US would tolerate a genuine democracy in the Middle East is actually preposterous and inconceivable. The US neoconservative agenda is all about controlling global resources and power. Democracy would quite clearly be a threat to this agenda. The 37"Middle East Not Swayed by 8ush's Democracy Pledgc," Angus-reid.com, Dec. 7,2005. 
